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Abstract 
The choice of policy instruments in order to achieve a cost efficient regulation has 
long been an important topic in the search for solutions to the environmental prob-
lems related to agricultural production. To some extent, analyses of the administra-
tive costs incurred in the design, implementation and operative phases of the individ-
ual regulations have been neglected. This apparent lack of information on the magni-
tude and variation of the administrative costs entails a potential for errors in actual 
policy design. 
 
In the present working paper, a selection of empirical studies on the administrative 
costs of agri-environmental regulations are surveyed with respect to topic, methodol-
ogy, data and results. The survey identifies the coverage of empirical studies and uses 
the results to tentatively indicate the approximate order of magnitude of the adminis-
trative costs. Furthermore, the survey identifies some of the determinants of adminis-
trative costs in an agri-environmental context. 
 
The survey shows that the administrative costs of regulation can be substantial and 
that large variations exist. However, the results are difficult to generalise and there is 
a bias in the material with few studies of the administrative costs of conventional 
regulations. Still, empirical and theoretical evidence indicate that market-based pol-
icy instruments are associated with lower administrative costs than conventional 
regulations. 
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1. Introduction 
Agricultural production potentially leads to environmental degradation and to prob-
lems associated with the provision of public goods in terms of landscape amenities, 
etc. In the last few decades, most countries have introduced different agri-
environmental regulations in order to address these problems. Theoretical and empiri-
cal studies have been performed to investigate different economic and financial as-
pects of such regulations, including analyses of the relative merits of market-based 
instruments and command-and-control measures with respect to cost-effectiveness of 
control costs. Analyses of the costs of implementing different policies are, however, 
significantly less frequent, and little effort has been devoted towards quantifying the 
transaction or administrative costs1 of individual policies. Where transaction costs are 
significant compared to the other costs of a given regulation, missing information on 
the magnitude and variation of the administrative costs entails a potential for errors in 
actual policy design. 
 
In order to qualify the discussions of the relative merits of different policy instru-
ments, there is a need to consider the magnitude and variations of the administrative 
costs of different regulations – and not just financial costs of payments, etc., or the 
compliance costs incurred by the regulated agents. To this end, this paper surveys the 
methodology, data and results of a selection of quantitatively oriented studies of the 
administrative costs of agri-environmental policies. 
 
Section 2.1 introduces and briefly discusses the central concepts of administrative 
costs in an agri-environmental context, and in section 2.2 the determinants of admini-
stration costs are identified. In chapter 3, the topics, methodology, data and results of 
the individual studies in the survey are discussed, highlighting some general aspects. 
In the main body of the survey, section 3.2, most of the individual studies are briefly 
described, with the results from a few of the main studies presented in more detail in 
order to infer some general tendencies regarding the variability of transaction costs 
and to tentatively identify some main determinants. The studies are grouped accord-
ing to geography, starting with Danish and Nordic studies. In chapter 4, the main 
findings and conclusions of the study are presented. 
                                                 
1 In this paper, the terms ’transaction costs’ and ’administrative costs’ are used interchangeably even 
though administrative tasks can be considered to constitute a subset of relevant transactions. When 
describing the different studies, the terminology used here closely reflects that of the individual 
studies. 
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2. Background 
2.1. Concepts and terminology 
The total costs of a given economic activity can be decomposed into transformation 
costs – i.e. direct production costs – and transaction costs, cf. Wallis & North (1986). 
This notion – and with it, the idea that administration costs can be separated from 
other costs of regulation – can be challenged on conceptual grounds2. However, with 
the approach of this paper, it is assumed that this distinction is indeed possible. Here, 
the total costs of a given regulation can be decomposed into compliance3 and admin-
istrative costs for private agents, whereas the public authorities, etc., incur administra-
tive costs as well as transfer payments, e.g. in the form of subsidies4. Compliance 
costs are the costs incurred by private agents, e.g. in the form of reduced or altered 
input or output composition in order to comply with the regulation. 
 
The administrative costs of agri-environmental regulation of agriculture are in this 
paper defined as the costs related to administrative tasks necessary to comply with the 
intentions and the directives of a given regulation. However, costs attributed to adap-
tations in the core production activities as a consequence of the regulation – compli-
ance costs – are excluded. In this paper, administrative costs are specifically observed 
or estimated costs, and are measured by the actual use of resources on administrative 
tasks implied by a given regulation or a set of regulations. 
 
Some administrative procedures, e.g. related to mandatory manure and fertiliser plans, 
can be attributed to general management planning related to the operation of the farm, 
etc., and hence a production cost. At the same time, resources spent on producing 
such plans may be seen as costs primarily incurred in order to comply with adminis-
trative requirements of existing regulation. Also, some administrative costs can be 
                                                 
2 E.g. should the use of measuring equipment and meters of a drinking water distribution system be 
considered to be production costs or transaction costs? 
3 E.g. in the form of reduced or altered input or output composition, in order to comply with regula-
tions. 
4 Another important category of indirect costs of regulations is the distortion costs that arise when 
tax revenues are raised to finance subsidies etc. Apart from the distortion of relative prices that leads 
to non-optimal resource allocation, the collection of taxes in itself entails administrative costs; see 
e.g. Salanié (2003). Distortion costs will not be touched further upon here. 
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very difficult to attribute to a certain regulation, as is the case for overhead costs for 
agencies responsible for the implementation and administration of several regulations. 
 
Administrative costs can be thought of as a subset of transaction costs and an addi-
tional category of costs to be considered when performing efficiency assessments of 
agri-environmental policy instruments or projects. In much of the surveyed literature, 
however, no distinction is made between the terms ‘administrative costs’ and ‘trans-
action costs’ and the terms are often used interchangeably. In the opinion of this au-
thor, the term transaction costs is a more comprehensive and theoretical concept com-
pared to administration costs, even though the distinction between concepts is diffi-
cult to execute. Transaction costs can be defined as the costs of using the price 
mechanism or “running the economic system” (Arrow 1969, p. 48), or more intui-
tively by a comparison to the phenomena of friction5. More generally, transaction 
costs can be thought to comprise the costs of establishing, modifying and transferring 
property rights6. Milgrom & Roberts (1992) separate transaction costs into coordina-
tion and motivation costs, referring to the costs of coordinating interactions between 
different agents, and costs related to the conflicting objectives of the involved agents. 
The coordination costs stem mainly from the bounded rationality of the agents7 and 
include the costs of bringing the agents together and writing up agreements. Motiva-
tion costs primarily arise as a consequence of the risk of opportunistic behaviour or as 
a consequence of incomplete and asymmetric8 information – especially before the 
agreement is made – and because agents may not always feel obliged to fulfil the 
terms after an agreement is made. 
 
Furthermore, transaction costs may be distinguished on the basis of the temporal oc-
currence, where ex ante transaction costs include e.g. search, drafting and negotiation 
costs incurred before the implementation of a regulation. Ex post transaction costs in-
clude costs related to monitoring and enforcement and possibly renegotiation of 
agreement terms in the case of e.g. voluntary measures. 
 
                                                 
5 ”Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems” (Williamson 1985, 
p. 19). 
6 Williamson (1996) distinguishes between transaction costs that arise from the use of the market 
and transaction costs that arise from internal coordination within the enterprise.  According to this 
distinction, the total indirect costs (as opposed to the direct, strictly production related costs, cf. the 
distinction between transformation and transaction costs) governance costs are composed of (inter-
nal) bureaucracy costs and (market) transaction costs. 
7 i.e. their limited ability to process information. 
8 E.g. when the agent has better knowledge of his production costs or capabilities than the regulator. 
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Table 1 presents the different administration activities and tasks according to different 
authors and their temporal distribution. Note that the terminology reflects the type of 
instrument that is referred to, for example ‘promotion’, ‘bargaining’ and ‘negotiating’ 
are used in connection to voluntary agreements, etc., whereas terms like ‘enactment’ 
and ‘prosecution’ reflect mandatory regulations, etc. 
 
Table 1. Administrative costs and implementation stages of regulation 
Phase 1 2 3 
Study Preparation Implementation Administration/Operation 
Dahlman (1979)  Search and information Bargaining and decision Monitoring and enforce-
ment 
Milgrom & Roberts (1992) Co-ordination Co-ordination Motivation 
Stavins (1995) Search and information Bargaining and decision Monitoring and enforce-
ment 
Carpentier et al. (1998) Information Contracting Enforcement 
Eklund (1999) Contact Contract Control 
Falconer & Whitby (1999) Information, Scheme set-
up, Promotion 
Contracting Policing (monitoring and 
enforcement) 
McCann & Easter (1999) Research, information, 
meeting and lobbying 
Design, implementation Administration, monitor-
ing, prosecution 
Thompson (1999) Enactment (by legislature) Implementation (by 
agency) 
Detection and prosecution 
Falconer & Saunders 
(2002) 
Negotiation Negotiation Ongoing, operational 
 
 
The different categories are not always clearly defined and certainly not independent 
of each other. To illustrate the interdependency between different types of costs, con-
sider a situation where ex ante transaction costs have been minimised in order to 
comply with budget restrictions. As a result, the terms of the agreement may be inter-
preted broadly and this may lead to costly litigation procedures or lack of compliance, 
effectively increasing monitoring and control costs. The net result may very well be 
that ex post transaction costs are increased by more than ex ante costs were reduced. 
 
In the context of agri-environmental regulation of agriculture, ex ante transaction 
costs may be preparatory work for legislation, drafting of voluntary agreements, set-
ting of charges, standards, etc. Ex post transaction costs may include the costs of 
monitoring, control and enforcement; the actual making of payments by agencies in 
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the case of subsidies, etc.; or the procurement and reporting of relevant documenta-
tion by farmers. 
 
Typical administrative tasks of the individual farmers include filling out forms and 
applications; collection, calculations and reporting of selected data as well as time and 
other resources spent on e.g. keeping up to date with rules and regulations concerning 
mandatory as well as voluntary approaches to regulation. In many cases, the use of 
consultants and auditors will at least partly be initiated by regulatory requirements, 
etc. Also, the resources spent on lobbying activities by professional organisations, etc. 
could be argued to be included in the administration costs of a given regulation. 
 
The administrative tasks of the authorities include most of the activities related to the 
preparation and information about new regulations, drafting of contracts or agree-
ments; designing, distributing and processing applications, decision making, handling 
complaints; and handling the payments, etc. 
 
There are many linkages between the administrative tasks of the farmers and those of 
the authorities, and a ‘mirror effect’ can be posited in that e.g. information activities 
of public agencies have ramifications for farmers’ resources spent on familiarizing 
themselves with a given set of regulations. Similarly, the care in the provision of 
timely and accurate data, etc. in filling out applications by farmers will influence re-
sources spent on public agencies’ application processing. 
 
Some studies touch briefly upon the dynamic aspects or the policy life cycle of im-
plementation and administration of regulations. Although the nomenclature is gener-
ally not agreed upon, three distinct phases – or rather, parts of the cycle – can be iden-
tified. The phases can be labelled preparation, implementation, and the administration 
or operation phase, cf. Table 1. 
2.2. Determinants - Factors affecting the administrative costs 
Almost all of the studies discuss the determinants and the variation patterns of admin-
istrative costs qualitatively with very few applications of quantitative methods. This 
bias is attributed to the complexity of the subject along with the frequent observation 
that often very little and incomplete data exists. The following section presents an 
overview and general discussion of the factors that determine the magnitude and 
variation of administrative costs. No universally agreed upon classification of deter-
minants exists. One way of systematically ordering such factors, is to distinguish be-
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tween qualitative and quantitative determinants, e.g. referring to number of hectares, 
number of applications, etc., or degree of specialisation, complexity, etc., respec-
tively. Quantitative and qualitative determinants are listed under headings that refer to 
the conventional grouping of dimensions in transaction costs economics in the tradi-
tion of Williamson (1985, 1991). 
2.2.1. Asset specificity 
The term is used to capture the idea that the transactions and interactions in the regu-
lation process require the use of highly specialised and specific knowledge, training, 
equipment, etc. Also, the specificity can refer to the degree to which special features 
or e.g. scientific interests can be found in an area, for which no apparent substitute 
exists. In traditional transaction costs economics, the concept is used to describe the 
extent to which case-specific investments have been made by a party to a transaction. 
A high degree of asset specificity implies limited scope for alternative uses of a given 
asset. This situation can lead to contractual problems e.g. of the ‘hold-up’ type, and 
costly safeguarding measures must be taken to protect the parties from opportunistic 
behaviour, leading to high transaction costs. In an agri-environmental regulation con-
text, specialised knowledge or equipment for e.g. monitoring and control, or property 
rights to e.g. locations of special scientific interest or site-specific environmental and 
natural goods and features, can be interpreted as a form of asset specificity that im-
plicitly entails a premium on administrative costs. 
2.2.2. Frequency, duration and reoccurrence 
Other important aspects that determine the costs of administration are the regularity of 
procedures or interactions. E.g. demands for repeated data collection, calculation and 
reporting, provide training as well as an impetus to adopt cost minimising routines 
etc. for a regulated agent. Ideally, this leads to decreasing costs per transaction and 
decreasing transaction costs with time, i.e. the number of years since a policy measure 
was established. This implies the existence of a learning curve and likely cost savings 
from fine-tuning and efficiency improvements because of experience gained in earlier 
stages (e.g. Falconer & Whitby 1999; & Vatn et al. 2002, p.43). In case of frequent 
changes in the regulations, eligibility criteria, etc., administration costs increase. 
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2.2.3. Uncertainty and complexity 
Generally, increases in the degree of uncertainty and the complexity of a given regu-
lation matter tend to increase the administrative costs. In case of uncertainty, more 
administrative resources are ideally directed towards planning, foreseeing possible 
contingencies and safeguarding the desired outcome. Relative to a situation with little 
uncertainty, this situation will tend to increase administration costs. Likewise, a high 
degree of complexity may demand more input of administrative resources than simple 
and straightforward regulatory issues. In the context of this study, complexity is inter 
alia reflected in the number of administrative agencies or authorities that must coor-
dinate their work with respect to a given regulation and the amount of technical or le-
gal information that must be processed by e.g. farmers and public agencies9. Also, the 
volume of data that must be collected, processed and reported in order to comply with 
a given regulation gives some indication of the complexity. 
 
Complexity is also influenced by the educational level and heterogeneity of the regu-
lated agents; the design of the relevant instrument, i.e. principles, definitions and de-
tailed regulations; as well as internal administrative institutions like routines and divi-
sion of labour or specialisation (Eklund, 1999). The technology available for e.g. 
monitoring and performing certain administrative tasks will influence administrative 
costs profoundly, and is a dynamic factor in affecting administrative costs in the fu-
ture. 
 
Generally, the need for coordination and hence the transaction costs are thought to 
increase with the number of agents or levels or tiers in a hierarchy, e.g. state, regional 
or local authorities. However, the resulting effect of a change in a multi-tiered organ-
isational set-up that e.g. involves the deletion or addition of a mid-level tier is not 
evident from the outset. On the one hand, the inclusion of an additional agency re-
sponsible for a share of the administrative task related to a given regulation will in it-
self increase the administrative burden because of additional operation costs and the 
increased demand for coordination between agencies on the different tiers and within 
tiers. On the other hand, the insertion of an additional agency in the regulatory struc-
ture may bring about improved coordination and communication between farmers and 
agencies, or may be able to favourably influence monitoring and control costs, lead-
ing to a reduction in over-all administrative costs. 
                                                 
9 Falconer & Whitby (1999) use the term ‘scheme transparency’ to denote this and also mentions the 
importance of the ease with which management requirements are understood by farmers without the 
need for professional advice. 
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The idea of complexity is closely linked to the concept of connectedness (cf. Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1992) that refers to whether or not a given transaction is linked to other 
transactions. In the case that some information used for the regulation of one aspect is 
already being systematically collected as a part of another regulation, the connected-
ness of the two regulations can lead to decreasing administrative costs compared to 
the case where the regulations are more independent of each other with respect to e.g. 
reporting of data. Other cases where the connectedness implies increased administra-
tion costs because of the need for more coordination can be envisioned, e.g. cases 
where many, concurrent and intertwining relations lead to a higher degree of trust and 
forbearance between the parties. 
2.2.4. Economies of scale 
The mere scale or magnitude of the regulations, especially the number of agents that 
are influenced and the number of involved agencies, will determine the total admini-
stration costs. Also, the number of regulations that affect a given environmental issue 
and the ensuing administrative tasks will impact on total costs. However, large scale 
in a given regulation scheme will potentially lead to economies of scale, implying 
decreasing costs given substantial fixed costs in the organisational set-up and because 
of the increased scope for specialisation, etc. Similarly, the existence of a learning 
curve is indicated by some studies, implying that the per transaction costs etc. de-
crease over time as cost minimising routines etc. are observed in several of the stud-
ies. 
2.2.5. Observability and measurability 
An important category of determinants is the degree to which compliance as well as 
non-compliance can be observed, and the extent to which e.g. agri-environmental in-
dicators can meaningfully be used to measure progress. Generally, if it is difficult to 
observe and/or measure relevant factors, there is a need for arranging the regulation in 
a way that is less dependent on accurate measures. This may imply sacrificing some 
economic efficiency, i.e. targeting of measures, for some simplicity in the administra-
tive set-up and operation. 
2.2.6. Market structure or other systems of exchange 
When regulation can be attached to existing market or government structures or other 
systems for exchange, the additional costs imposed by the new regulation are modest 
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compared to the establishment of new administrative set-ups. Although this is not 
normally a concern of transaction costs economics in the tradition of Williamson 
(1985, 1991), Vatn et al. (2002) finds that commodities and services for which a mar-
ket already exist are much less costly to regulate than e.g. environmental goods that 
are not linked to any market structures. Therefore, policy measures like environmen-
tal taxes on commercially sold fertilizers have relatively low transaction costs, whe-
reas administrative regulations that require a case by case assessment, etc., by perhaps 
several agencies can be costly in terms of administrative routines. This is also due to 
differences in the number of access points of regulation; administrative tasks related 
to a tax on input are isolated to the relatively few supplier or wholesale firms whereas 
regulation targeting individual firms potentially involves a much higher number of 
agents, cf. the Danish animal manure handling requirements. Stavins (1995, p. 135) 
cites an example with refineries and the US EPA leaded gasoline phase-down, where 
the trading agents (refineries) were already experienced in dealing with each other. 
This implied minimal administrative requirements and a high level of trading in sub-
sequent market based programmes. 
2.2.7. Other determinants 
Finally, the following aspects have been mentioned by the authors of some of the stu-
dies of this survey to be important factors affecting the level of administrative costs. 
• The potential for using e.g. information or GIS10 technology to provide reliable 
data and communications quickly and with decreasing costs. 
• The attitude of the regulated agents towards the regulation, given its influence on 
e.g. risk of non-compliance. 
The information and promotional efforts by the authorities in the early stages may in-
fluence the farmers’ knowledge and attitude towards a given regulation, thus affecting 
the level of compliance and, indirectly, monitoring and control costs. 
                                                 
10 Geographical Information System 
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3. Survey 
In the first section of this chapter, some general features or questions raised by the 
survey with respect to the objectives, topics, data sources, methodology, and presenta-
tion of the results of the studies are outlined. In the second section, the individual stu-
dies are presented in geographical order. 
3.1. Basic issues and considerations 
3.1.1. Objectives 
In most of the studies of this survey, the objective is to estimate the magnitude of the 
administrative costs of selected agri-environmental policies. In order to illustrate the 
significance of administrative costs, most studies compare these estimates to other re-
levant costs connected with the policy in question, i.e. compliance costs, tax revenues, 
or total subsidies or payments. Frequently, the factors determining the magnitude and 
variability of the administration costs – i.e. the determinants –are tentatively identi-
fied in discussions of the results. The determinants are investigated using theoretical, 
hypothetical or conceptual arguments. Only a few studies aim at analysing the deter-
minants empirically using econometric techniques, etc. 
 
Studies also differ with respect to their aims at estimating total transaction costs or 
merely differences in transaction costs when comparing policies (Thompson 1998). 
The latter case is often the result of limited data availability or is used when the objec-
tive is simply to determine the relative merits of different policy instruments. Also, 
only a few studies make direct comparisons of the administrative costs of different 
policy instruments aimed at the same environmental problem (McCann & Easter, 
1999; Carpentier et al. 1998; Thompson, 1999; and – to some extent – Falconer & 
Saunders, 2001). Although some of the studies set out to investigate running as well 
as start-up costs, the data material is not good enough to support any conclusions ex-
cept those of the running costs. 
 
The majority of studies focus on the public costs of administration, whereas private 
sector administration costs, e.g. filing applications and lobbying by farmers or envi-
ronmental groups, is the subject of fewer studies. Only a few studies aim at estimating 
both public and private administrative costs, e.g. Vatn et al. (2002). 
 
14 Administration Costs of Agri-environmental Regulations, FOI 
3.1.2. Regulatory instruments 
A traditional way of classifying environmental policy instruments is by dividing them 
into either administrative11 or incentive mechanisms12. The latter are sometimes di-
vided into price mechanisms – charges, subsidies, taxes, refunds/deposits – and mar-
ket or quantity mechanisms such as tradable permits or quotas (Gustafsson, 1999). A 
third class of instruments is often added, namely policy instruments based on volun-
tary agreements and information or suasion. In practice, however, the distinction be-
tween different instruments is not always clear, in that e.g. voluntary management 
agreements entailing compensation may be considered to be mere subsidies. 
 
The majority of the studies in the survey analyse voluntary programmes that typically 
involve some kind of negotiated management agreements. In these programmes, the 
farmer will agree to adapt his management practices to comply with certain environ-
mental or scientific objectives in return for some kind of monetary compensation. 
Only a few studies have looked at the administrative costs of traditional command-
and-control measures (e.g. McCann & Easter, 1999) and this apparent bias impedes a 
thorough comparison of the administrative costs of different classes of instruments, 
e.g. administrative regulation with market based instruments. 
 
A possible explanation for this bias is that agencies involved in policy implementation 
and administration are often responsible for several concurrent regulations, making a 
disaggregation of costs to individual regulations difficult. However, when a new pro-
gramme like voluntary management agreements is introduced, the funding agency 
will often require that costs be fully accounted for. Thus, costs linked to the introduc-
tion of novel singular instruments will generally be easier to identify than policy 
measures that have evolved incrementally in a complex framework with other similar 
regulations. 
3.1.3.  Methodology and data sources 
The general approach to estimating transaction or administration costs of agri-
environmental schemes is to simply add all costs associated with the preparation, im-
plementation, and operation of the relevant policies. This process often involves iden-
tifying the different relevant activities and quantifying them in terms of labour input 
                                                 
11 Alternatively labelled regulatory or command-and-control measures, CAC, like standards, targets, 
and permissions. 
12 Market based instruments, MBI. 
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and other resource use – e.g. computer costs and expenses related to printing and dis-
tribution of information material – in real or monetary terms. If costs are predomi-
nantly quantified in terms of labour input, average salaries or representative wages are 
utilized to express the resource use in monetary terms. 
 
In order to quantify costs etc., several studies rely on interviews with key persons in 
agencies relevant for the policy in question for estimates of transaction costs based on 
information from annual reports, budgets, time accounting systems, etc. This ap-
proach is in fact comparable to regular budgeting activities, and can be thought of as 
ex ante assessments of policy implementation costs. Moreover, the key persons that 
are interviewed for the studies are in many cases the persons responsible for budget-
ing, etc. (McCann & Easter, 2000), and as such, confidence should be placed in their 
estimates. 
 
A fundamentally different approach is where transaction costs are calculated as the 
margin between the buying and selling price of a commodity in a given market. This 
interpretation – i.e. transaction costs as the financial costs of brokerage services – is 
used by Stavins (1995) in a theoretical model analysing the efficiency of tradable 
permit schemes in the presence of fixed transaction costs and constant, decreasing or 
increasing marginal transaction costs. An example of an empirical study based on a 
similar methodology is Gangadharan (2000). This approach of course requires the ex-
istence of a market for environmentally related goods or services, but has not yet been 
applied to agri-environmental regulations – e.g. transferable quotas – ,as far as the au-
thor of this study is informed. 
 
The most frequent data source of the studies is interviews with key personnel. Often, 
these interviews are based on or supplemented by information collected from budgets, 
accounts, audit reports, etc. Costs are in some cases disaggregated to identify costs 
associated with single or groups of regulations on the basis of best judgements or by 
using organisation charts or data from time accounting systems (Eklund 1999). A few 
studies are based on administrative records of individual cases (McCann & Easter, 
2000) or on case files, detailing individual transactions such as correspondence, meet-
ings, etc. Time input requirements for these individual transactions are then based on 
observations from case studies (Falconer & Saunders, 2001). Furthermore, interviews 
with farmers and/or questionnaires are used to capture the costs of farmers and or-
ganisations, e.g. (Vatn. et al. 2002) interviewed 4-22 selected farmers about their time 
input spent on different regulations. In determining private costs, studies like 
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Vernimmen et al. (2000) use questionnaire survey data to establish the resource use 
from farmers. 
 
Generally, the scope for analyses of administrative costs seems to be restricted by the 
limited possibilities of establishing a comprehensive data base, as there appears to be 
no or very little systematic collection of data exclusively for this purpose. Still, possi-
bilities of establishing rough estimates for the administrative costs of introducing 
novel, singular schemes exist, whereas identification of costs incurred explicitly by a 
given regulation is problematic, especially if the relevant agency is responsible for 
other related regulations, as is often the case. 
3.1.4. Generalisation of results 
In the studies, administrative cost figures are presented in absolute terms, e.g. as the 
total costs per year, or in relative terms, e.g. as a percentage of total costs or compli-
ance costs; or relative to the total amount of subsidies. For some results, the costs are 
presented relative to structural factors or similar measures, e.g. per hectare or per par-
ticipant. 
 
Merely presenting total costs is not very useful for drawing inference about other 
conditions or about other than the very regulation examined in the study. In order to 
generalise the results, transaction costs are often shown relative to the compensation 
payments of the policy, or are indicated as a percentage of compliance costs, total tax 
revenue, etc. Such a presentation makes the results very sensitive to the levels of 
payments and their fluctuations, making especially comparison of the temporal varia-
tions difficult to track, cf. Eklund (1999). 
 
A presentation of the private administration costs relative to e.g. compliance costs or 
compensation payments received is not found directly in the relatively few studies at-
tempting to quantify private administration costs. This makes a comparison between 
relative public and private costs very difficult. 
The diversity of the studies in regulatory framework and the variance in cost levels 
arising from the diversity in countries and traditions, customs, methodological ap-
proach, data sources, etc. makes inter-study comparisons or estimate-transfers very 
difficult. Also, the results are difficult to generalise because of the many variations of 
policy instruments, agri-environmental schemes, etc., that exist. In some cases, even 
schemes with similar names – e.g. organic farming aid – are very different in their 
structures (Falconer & Whitby 1999, p. 81). Furthermore, administrative set-ups and 
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traditions, general price and wage levels, etc., differ significantly between countries 
and over time. This makes comparisons of different studies even more difficult and 
also impedes using specific results as parameter estimates in modelling transaction or 
administrative costs. 
 
Moreover, a lot of variation exists as to which components of the administration costs 
to include in the different studies, leading to even less scope for inter-study compari-
sons of results. To some extent it seems that variable components are easier to iden-
tify or account for than fixed costs. This potentially leads to systematic underestima-
tion of the administrative costs of policy instruments for which a large share of the 
costs are non-variable, and vice versa. 
 
A third category of obstacle to generalisation of the results of the individual studies is 
the dynamic lag effect that arises when e.g. assessing relative costs. Eklund (1999) 
cautions that care should be taken when comparing administrative costs to annual 
payments, as there are often temporal displacements between administrative tasks e.g. 
application processing and the actual transfer of payments. This potentially leads to 
flawed estimations of relative costs when viewing payments over short time spans. 
The same problem arises when the relevant regulation is only in effect for a short time 
or if schemes evolve and change their eligibility criteria, etc. 
 
In general, the results of the individual studies may indicate some general features of 
the policy instruments analysed but should be used cautiously, especially in compari-
sons. 
3.2. Individual studies 
Denmark 
A number of Danish studies have estimated the administrative costs of regulation in 
an agri-environmental context. Based on a gross simplification, the main Danish agri-
environmental regulations can be divided into three main categories: 
• Nature, biodiversity and recreation: Typically subsidies and compensated volun-
tary agreements with eligibility criteria often based on farms’ locations in desig-
nated zones, e.g. afforestation or sensitive agricultural areas. 
• Pesticides: Pesticide tax combined with approval procedures, development and 
dissemination of information and decision support systems, required documenta-
tion and training. 
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• Nitrogen and other plant nutrients: Primarily administrative regulation based on 
non-tradable quotas and documentation requirements, technical specifications for 
equipment, etc. 
 
In Jacobsen et al. (2004), public as well as private administrative costs related to the 
regulation of manure and mineral fertilizer are estimated from interviews with key 
personnel in relevant agencies based on budgets and accounts information. Also, a 
simple survey of 50 farmers made by professionals from the Danish agricultural ex-
tension service13 was performed to give an indication of the farmers’ time resource 
input in order to comply with manure and fertilizer handling regulations. Further-
more, the study estimates the public administrative costs of a list of other instruments 
of the second Danish Aquatic Programme (VMPII), including a general inspection of 
agricultural holdings performed by personnel from the technical divisions of the mu-
nicipalities14, subsidies for afforestation, establishment of wetlands, and negotiated 
management agreements in environmentally sensitive areas. The cost estimates are 
presented as total annual costs and relative to total payments; the latter ranging from 4 
to 11 per cent with an average of 8 per cent. The public costs are disaggregated into 
different government agencies and to the different levels of local government. 
 
Schou (2003) presents estimates of public administrative costs in an analysis of the 
economic costs of land use changes aimed at protecting groundwater resources from 
agricultural pollution. He compares the administrative costs of afforestation grants 
and compensated set-aside schemes based on time and wage estimates from govern-
ment officials and consultants as well as from annual reports. Administrative costs are 
calculated from estimated time input use (hours per application by farmers and differ-
ent agencies, etc.) and standard hourly wages computed in annuities to facilitate a 
comparison between schemes with different time frames of 5 and 20 years. Results 
are presented as costs per successful application in budget economic as well as in wel-
fare economic terms in 1997 Danish Kroner (DKK). The administrative costs per ap-
plication measured in budget economic terms are 1.120 DKK for afforestation grants 
and 540 DKK for compensated set-aside schemes. In welfare economic terms, the 
similar figures are 850 and 550 DKK, respectively. 
                                                 
13 Dansk Landbrugsrådgivning 
14 The local government/authorities 
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In an evaluation report of administration of the MVJ-scheme15 (Amtsrådsforeningen16 
& Strukturdirektoratet17 1999), administrative costs and payments of the programme 
are presented for 1994 and onwards. The scheme includes more than a dozen different 
management agreements that have 5- or 20-year life spans, and different organisa-
tional set-ups were employed in the period, e.g. with respect to the delegation of ad-
ministrative tasks between central and regional authorities. This makes a clear and 
unambiguous presentation of e.g. the relative costs of administration difficult. The fo-
cus of the study is on the regional administration of the scheme undertaken by the 
counties, and hence, the presentation of the results to some extent disregards the ad-
ministrative costs by central agencies; e.g. the costs of monitoring acreage and man-
agement practices, etc., by the Plant Directorate, is not included in the cost estimates. 
The results relate to the number of agreements, the affected acreage, and the volume 
of the payments as well as the administrative costs of regional and central authorities. 
Based on selected results from the report, table 2 presents the administrative costs for 
1996, 1997 and 1998. 
 
Table 2. Public administration costs per agreement and per hectare and relative 
to actual payments of the MVJ-scheme, 1996-1998 
 1996 1997 1998
Administrative costs, mil-
lion DKK (Adm.C.) 17.2 20.7 22
 
Actual payments, million 
DKK 37.8 50.8 62.2
Adm.C relative to actual 
payments (per cent) 46 41 35
  
No. of new agreements 1957 1732 1879
Adm.C. per agreement 
(DKK) 8789 11952 11708
 
Area, new agreements 
(1000 ha) 12 10.5 12.8
Adm.C. per ha (DKK/ha) 1433 1971 1719
   
Total area under agree-
ments (1000 ha) 52.6 64.7 75.1
Adm.C. per ha, accumu-
lated (DKK/ha) 327 320 293
Source:  Amtsrådsforeningen & Strukturdirektoratet (1999, pp. 20-25) 
Note:  The cost estimates do not include physical on-site inspection, etc., performed by local  
departments of the central authority the Plant Directorate. 
                                                 
15 Miljøvenlige Jordbrugsforanstaltninger, the Danish programme for voluntary management 
agreements in environmentally sensitive areas. 
16 Council of Regional Boards 
17 Directorate of Structural Development 
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Total administration costs range from 17.2 million DKK to 22.0 million DKK from 
1996 to 1998, with a share of 5.6 to 6.4 million DKK from the central authority and 
the balance – some 70 per cent – representing the administrative costs of the counties, 
i.e. the regional authorities. In table 2, the actual payments made in the relevant year 
are used to describe the volume of payments, although the report uses various meas-
ures in order to describe the monetary flow of the scheme. The administrative costs 
are reduced from 46 to 35 per cent of the actual payments made from 1996 to 1998. 
 
This is thought to indicate a learning curve, i.e. that cost minimising routines for 
processing of applications, etc., are being established over time. Another explanation 
for this development is that the administrative costs relate to both processing applica-
tions and making yearly payments for previously established agreements. With long 
term agreements, a progressively larger share of the payments made in a specific year 
relate to previously established agreements, and thus a declining share of the adminis-
trative tasks concern processing applications, which is assumed to be more demand-
ing in terms of administrative inputs than merely making periodic transfers of pay-
ments. Also, the declining share of administrative costs relative to the actual pay-
ments made possibly reflects economies of scale in the making of actual payments. 
 
When considering the administrative costs relative to the number of agreements, no 
learning curve or economies of scale seem to exist. According to the report, this re-
flects the fact that parallel organisations were established in both central and regional 
authorities, thereby to a certain extent duplicating the administrative tasks. The same 
development is revealed in the administrative costs relative to the area under new 
agreements, which also seems to show some lack of balance between scheme uptake 
and administrative capacity. However, when considering the administration costs 
relative to the total area under the scheme, a vaguely declining trend can be observed. 
This can partly be explained by the idea that these costs are progressively related to 
the making of payments, whereas the administrative costs per hectare under new 
agreements mainly are related to the relatively costly – in terms of administrative re-
sources – tasks of processing applications. In sum, the results indicate that the admin-
istrative costs of the scheme have been significant relative to the establishment of new 
agreements as well as – albeit at a declining rate –to the actual payments made. How-
ever, the existence of a learning curve or economies of scale is suggested by the de-
clining administrative costs relative to the accumulated area. 
 
The Directorate of Food, Fisheries and Agri-Business (Direktoratet for FødevareErh-
verv, 2003) finds similar results for the horizontal measures of the MVJ-scheme in 
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their mid-term assessment of the Danish implementation of the Rural Development 
Programme. Although the results presented here can not be directly compared to the 
results shown in table 2, similar results and trends are observed. A figure of 24.2 mil-
lion DKK is estimated as the annual administrative costs including monitoring costs 
causing a generally higher level of relative costs – e.g. per agreement or per hectare – 
than results from the above study that do not include the monitoring activities of the 
local departments of the central authority, the Plant Directorate. This implies that the 
percentage of administrative costs relative to payments is some 54 per cent and the 
administrative costs per new agreement is almost 12,800 DKK, both figures repre-
senting increases relative to the 1996-1998 figures shown in table 2. Conversely, the 
administrative costs relative to the acreage under new agreements is 1400 DKK per 
hectare, significantly less than the similar figures in table 2. However, because of dif-
ferences in the payments indicators, the numbers of these to studies should not be di-
rectly compared and no firm conclusions should be made with respect to the trend or 
direction of the relative administrative costs, and the numbers should merely be used 
to illustrate the magnitude of the administrative costs and to identify possible deter-
minants of administrative costs. 
 
In a comparison of the relative merits of subsidies for afforestation and a property re-
structuring approach as instruments for a reduction in non-point source pollution from 
agriculture, Mouritsen (2004) and Mouritsen et al. (2002) present some rough esti-
mates of the per case costs of administration and planning. Costs are presented as a 
fixed amount per hectare and are based on information from planning professionals 
from implementing agencies like the National Forest and Nature Agency18 and the 
Directorate for Food, Fisheries and Agri-Business. Public transaction costs for admin-
istrative and planning tasks are estimated to be 1000 DKK per hectare for the property 
restructuring instrument, but no information about the specific nature of these tasks is 
given in the study. For comparison, subsidised afforestation includes an initial pay-
ment of 22,000 DKK per hectare and an annual income compensation of 2,600 DKK 
per hectare for twenty years. 
 
A number of sources for official government estimates of administrative costs exist in 
the form of annual reports from relevant authorities. Inspection of agricultural hold-
ings with regular intervals with respect to procedures and equipment for the storage 
and handling of manure, fertilisers and pesticide, etc., is performed by the technical 
divisions of the local governments (municipalities) in Denmark with the Forest and 
                                                 
18 In Danish: Skov- og Naturstyrelsen, SNS 
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Nature Agency as the national authority. The extent of the inspection is detailed in the 
annual report by the Danish EPA (Miljøstyrelsen, 2004) including the use of, as well 
as estimates of other costs. Also the annual reports of the Danish Plant Directorate19 
can be used as a source for the costs of monitoring and controlling farmers’ manda-
tory manure accounting, field and fertiliser application plans and pesticide application 
logs. 
3.2.1. Other Nordic countries 
Eklund (1999) estimates the public transaction costs of three agri-environmental 
schemes of environmentally friendly agriculture programmes in Sweden for the years 
1996 and 1997. The programmes include measures to preserve bio-diversity, cultural 
heritage and open landscapes in forested areas. The policies are based on compen-
sated voluntary agreements with respect to special management practices. Results are 
presented in terms of total transaction costs and relative to the payments. The admin-
istrative costs are estimated to be 13.5, 16.5 and 8.3 per cent of the payments made to 
the farmers, respectively, for each of these measures. The quantitative results are 
based on financial reports and the time accounting system of the national Swedish 
Board of Agriculture20 and the regional County Administrative Boards21 as well as 
interviews with key persons in other local and state authorities. In order to compare 
cost levels, Eklund (1999) presents results from the Swedish Board of Agriculture re-
garding the administrative costs of a selection of agricultural policy instruments, e.g. 
livestock and acreage subsidies, support for structural and regional development. 
These results too are presented as annual total administrative costs and as percentages 
of total payments. 
 
Table 3 shows that the magnitude of the relative public administrative costs for dif-
ferent types of agricultural programs on the average is around five per cent of the 
payments to farmers. However, policies in the agri-environmental field are associated 
with much higher costs, e.g. 13 to 18 per cent. 
The estimated costs do not reflect farmers’ administration costs which could vary sig-
nificantly between different policy types, thus ultimately affecting the ranking of total 
public and private administrative costs. 
 
                                                 
19 In Danish: Plantedirektoratet, www.pdir.dk 
20 Swedish: Jordbruksverket 
21 Swedish: Länsstyrelsen 
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Table 3. Public administrative costs for some Swedish agricultural policy pro-
grams, 1996 
Policies Farmer payments
(Million SEK)
Administration costs
(Million SEK)
Administration as 
per cent of farmer 
payments
Administration as 
per cent of total 
costs
Arable area pay-
ments 3836 103.0 2.7% 2,6%
Animal grants 791 32.1 4.1% 3,9%
Agri-environment 
policies 645 115.5
18% 
(1997: 13%) 15,2%
Structure support 670 26.8 4.0% 3,8%
Source: Eklund (1999), p. 54 table 5. Based on data from the Swedish Board of Agriculture (SBA 1997d & 
1998d) and own calculations 
 
 
Table 4 shows the administration costs of three measures as a percentage of transfers 
to farmers. 
 
 
Table 4. Administrative costs as percentage of compensation payments, 
1997 
Type of measure Farmer payments made
1997
(million SEK)
Administrative costs
(million SEK)
Administration costs as a
percentage of farmer
payments
 
Open landscape 593 49.3 8.3%
Bio-diversity 216 29.2 13.5%
Cultural heritage 245 40.5 16.5%
Source: Eklund 1999, p. 56, table 7, based on data and estimations from the Department of Economics at the 
Swedish Board of Agriculture (time accounting systems), FEOGA, time accounting systems at the County 
Administrative Boards, estimation by key persons at Ministry of Agriculture, the Swedish Board of Antiquities, 
The National Environmental Protection Board 
 
 
Eklund (1998, p. 58) estimates the distribution of administrative resources between 
activities in the different phases of regulation, based on interviews with 10 key per-
sons from some of the 24 County Administrative Boards22. 5 to 10 per cent of the 
administrative resources are spent on information to the farmers about the measures 
and the application, while 60-70 per cent is spent on processing the applications. 
These tasks include entering data, administrative controls, examination of applica-
tions and decision-making, etc. And finally, 20 to 35 per cent of the administrative 
                                                 
22 Basing the estimates solely on sources from County Administrative Boards is justified as these 
boards represent some 70 per cent of total (public) administrative costs according to Eklund (1999 
p. 55, table 6). 
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resources are used in the control phase for monitoring and enforcement. Activities in-
clude preparatory work, travelling time, inspections in the field, making decisions and 
calculating levels of sanction in case of non-compliance. 
 
In sum, the results indicate that most resources spent by public agencies on the ad-
ministration of voluntary schemes are used on processing applications. Furthermore, 
considerable resources – up to about one third of total – are spent on monitoring and 
enforcing the regulations. Only a small proportion – 5 to 10 per cent of the adminis-
trative resources – is spent on pre-scheme implementation of information measures to 
farmers. It can be argued, that more information could lead to resource savings in the 
processing of applications – fewer mistakes, fewer rejections because ineligibility cri-
terions are known, etc. – and in the monitoring and enforcement because pre-scheme 
information may lead to increased motivation for complying with agreements, etc. In 
a more qualitative section, the study examines the determinants of transaction costs 
by analysing to what extent transaction costs are influenced by the characteristics of 
the good, the design of the instruments, internal administrative institutions, as well as 
the frequency and uncertainty of transactions. 
 
Adikhari (2001) cites an unpublished study23 that estimates private transaction costs 
incurred by farmers participating in the Swedish agri-environmental programme, 
based on a survey of 90 randomly selected farmers. Farmers’ transaction costs include 
expenditures for assistance from consultants in agriculture or conservation, mapping, 
communication costs related to participation, as well as time resource inputs. On av-
erage, consultants’ costs are reported to account for approximately one-third of the 
total costs and the individual's labour accounted for approximately two-thirds. Trans-
action costs, as a share of actual compensation received, are typically around 12 per 
cent, and private transaction costs have risen over recent years. 
 
Vatn (2002) and Vatn et al. (2002) present the results from a survey of the transaction 
costs of various agricultural policies in Norway. The background of both studies is the 
costs of targeting policies that involve jointly or complementarily produced public 
goods, and this trade-off between precision and transaction costs is discussed in rela-
tion to the concept of multifunctionality and international trade policies. The focus of 
Vatn (2002) is the implications of designing efficient incentives for the provision of 
public goods on barriers to world trade. The actual quantification of transaction costs 
                                                 
23 Kumm & Drake (1998). The study has not been available for this presentation. 
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is reported in Vatn et al. (2002) that focus on optimal policies when transaction costs 
are positive and the provision of public goods is linked to agricultural production. 
 
Vatn et al. (2002) estimate the transaction costs of eleven different Norwegian agri-
cultural policy measures, including both support and agri-environmental programmes, 
e.g. environmental taxes on mineral fertilizers and pesticides. Transaction costs are 
estimated as the total public and private costs in terms of manpower, computers, etc., 
of the administrative tasks related to each regulation. Tasks include processing appli-
cations, handling payments (taxes/subsidies), and some monitoring and enforcement 
activities. Transaction costs are quantified through interviews with representatives 
from different public administration agencies, whole-sellers and farmers involved, 
and include labour costs, general overhead as calculated per man year, computer 
costs, and costs related to information material and postage. 
 
The analysis is based on a transaction costs perspective as developed by Williamson 
(1985). However, the authors have modified the approach to better serve the purpose 
of an analysis of agricultural policies distinct from the manufacturing or production 
framework, from which the theory originates. Asset specificity24 and frequency are 
considered to be major determinants of transaction costs, and a special framework is 
established to categorize the individual measures or policies according to the specific-
ity and frequency of the transactions associated with them. Theoretically, transaction 
costs of regulations involving assets with high degrees of specificity should be high, 
whereas the administrative costs of regulations involving frequently reoccurring 
transactions should be relatively low. 
 
Focus is on running costs, as set-up or establishment costs could not be quantified for 
lack of data. For policy measures affecting transaction costs at the farm level, a num-
ber of farmers – ranging from 4 to 22 depending on the type of instrument – were in-
terviewed for data on farmers’ costs. For local government levels, a single county and 
a single municipality were considered to be representative for the whole group. 
Transaction costs for the year 2000 are presented as percent of payments to farmers or 
tax revenue, where applicable. Costs are also presented as costs per unit of the good 
the payments are attached to, e.g. per hectare and per animal for payments related to 
acreage or number of animals, respectively. 
 
                                                 
24 Implying the need for targeting. 
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Transaction costs for policy instruments like price support (milk etc.) and environ-
mental taxes on mineral fertilizer and pesticides are estimated to be in the range from 
0.24 – 12.3 per cent. Similarly, the transaction costs of acreage and livestock pay-
ments as well as subsidies for reduced tillage fall within 1- 6.8 per cent of the pay-
ments. Corresponding figures for acreage and conversion support for organic farming 
are from 18.3 to 29 per cent and up to more than 63 per cent if additional monitoring 
and enforcement procedures are included. The highest relative transaction costs are 
estimated for support measures aimed at preserving cattle races and special landscape 
features. These costs range from 54 to 66 per cent and even up to 138 per cent in the 
case of requirements for additional monitoring. The results vary with the volume of 
the payments and should be interpreted with care. However, it seems that instruments 
linked to existing market structures – e.g. tax on commercially sold fertilizers – or to 
information that is already being collected25 have relatively low transaction costs. 
Conversely, if policy instruments depend on additional information gathering and 
monitoring, the administrative costs will constitute a significant proportion of total 
costs. 
 
Table 5 presents the relative transaction costs of the analysed measures, i.e. the per-
centage of transaction costs relative to the total transfer payments of each individual 
measure. An A or B is assigned according to whether or not policies are attached to 
existing commodities exchanged on the market, implying the degree of asset specific-
ity. An A corresponds to a low degree of asset specificity, and a B indicates that the 
degree of asset specificity is medium (B1 and B2) or high (B3). Also, numbers 1, 2 
and 3 denotes the frequency with which the transaction takes place. A1 indicates high 
frequencies, A2 and B1 denote medium frequencies, and B2 and B3 signify low fre-
quency of the transactions. 
 
On the basis of a theoretical discussion, Vatn et al. (2002, p. 35) analyse qualitatively 
the levels of different transaction cost components – information, contract and control 
– and present expected levels of total transaction costs in relative terms. Transactions 
with increasing degrees of asset specificity imply increasing transaction costs, 
whereas increasing the frequency of transactions leads to lower transaction costs. 
From this, the transaction costs of A1 and A2 measures, etc., can be expected to yield 
minimal to low and low to medium transaction costs, respectively, whereas B1, B2 
and B3 measures are expected to yield medium, medium to high, and high transaction 
costs. 
                                                 
25 E.g. acreage or livestock herd size information for hectare and headage premia. 
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Table 5. Transfer payments and transaction costs for measured as per cent of 
payments 
Policy instrument Subsidy/tax
(million NOK)
TC as per cent of subsidy/tax 
Measures A Measures B
B1 Acreage payments 3267 0.96
B1 Livestock payments 2088 2.29
A1 Price support on milk 520 0.24
A1 Environmental tax on fertilizers 158 0.09
B1 Subsidy for reduced tillage 133 6.81
B3 Support for special landscape fea-
tures 
113 53.92
A2 Environmental tax on pesticides 53 1.11
B2 Acreage support to organic farming 19 18.34-63.31)
B2 Conversion support to organic farm-
ing 
7 29.04
A2 Price support on home-refined dairy 
products 
1 12.28
B2 Support for preserving cattle races 1 66.3 – 138.42)
Source:  Tables 5.26 and 5.27 from Vatn et al. 2002, pp. 69-70 
Notes:  1) Depending on whether or not control/monitoring of production method is included 
  2) Depending on whether or not register is included 
 
 
Table 5 shows that A1 and B1 measures are characterised by relatively low transac-
tion costs and quite large monetary transfers of subsidies or taxes, whereas A2 and B2 
(and B3) measures are characterised by significant relative transaction costs as well as 
smaller transfers. Generally, measures in the A group have lower relative costs of 
administration than measures or policies in group B, and similarly, group 1 measures 
are relatively cheaper than measures in group 2 and 3. Cf. chapter 5 for a discussion 
of the appropriateness of comparing policy instruments on the basis of their relative 
administrative costs. 
 
Notice the difference between the relative transaction costs of environmental taxes on 
fertilizers and pesticides – although in the same order of magnitude – seem to be quite 
significant. This is probably due to the fact that Norwegian pesticide taxes are deter-
mined on the basis of environmental and health risk indicators, and thus the applica-
ble tax rate is based on a ranking according to environmental risks. Conversely, a tax 
on nitrogen fertilizer can more easily be determined if it is on the basis of nitrogen or 
phosphorous content. In sum, proper determination of pesticide tax rates on the basis 
of biological risk assessments etc. requires specialised knowledge and additional 
analyses, i.e. high asset specificity. On the other hand, transaction costs can be con-
sidered to be lower in case of an environmental tax based on dollar value or nitrogen 
content of commercially sold fertilisers, which can be considered readily available in-
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formation that requires little or no specialised knowledge or equipment, i.e. low speci-
ficity. 
 
Rougour et al. (2001) cite the results of a Swedish study26 regarding the administra-
tive costs of a tax on nitrogen fertiliser and reports that these costs were less than 0.8 
per cent of the charge revenue. Similarly, Rougoor (2001) cites a study27 of an Aus-
trian levy on nitrogen as well as potassium and phosphorous, where administration 
costs of the full system amounted to 0.7 per cent of revenues. It has not been possible 
to obtain any description of the data, methodology, etc., of these studies, and the re-
sults are therefore considered with some reservations. However, the results of these 
studies generally correspond well with the findings of Vatn et al. (2002). 
3.2.2. Europe 
Falconer and Whitby (1999) summarise the findings of eight country studies per-
formed under the STEWPOL project, designed to evaluate the administrative costs of 
individual EU countries’ implementation of various agri-environmental schemes. 
Based on individual studies, the authors estimate the public transaction costs of 37 
agri-environmental schemes in the countries28. There are large variations in the actual 
design and implementation of the regulations in individual countries, so the different 
results are not easily comparable. 
 
Average annual administration costs of the mid 1990s of the various agri-
environmental schemes from each country are presented in the study (Falconer & 
Whitby 1999, p. 77). When considering the area affected, costs range from 9 to more 
than 75 ECU per hectare. Per participant, administrative costs range from 140 to more 
than 1500 ECU, and administration costs constitute from less than 7 to more than 87 
per cent of the compensation payments. For ease of comparison, Falconer and Whitby 
(1999, p. 78) present results from other studies to illustrate the relative magnitude of 
transaction costs of agricultural commodity regimes, e.g. arable area or set-aside and 
livestock payments, in Germany, Sweden and the UK. Administrative costs of arable 
area payments range from 0.8 to 4 per cent of total public scheme costs, while similar 
figures for payments related to livestock fall within the range from 2.5 to 20 per cent. 
Furthermore, results displaying the magnitude of transaction costs related to time 
                                                 
26 Jonsson et al. (1997).The study has not been available for this presentation. 
27 Hofreither & Sinabell (1998). The study has not been available for this presentation. 
28 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany (in Saxony, Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein), Greece, Italy, 
Sweden and Northern England. 
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frame – i.e. years since scheme implementation – as well as number of participants 
are presented in the study, indicating the existence of economies of scale as well as a 
learning curve, implying that the administration costs of policy schemes will tend to 
decrease over time, ceteris paribus. 
 
Also, Adhikari (2001, pp. 13-14) refers to another unpublished study29 under the 
STEWPOL project aiming at determining the causes of participation of farmers in 
agri-environmental programs in eight EU states. The study outlines a theoretical 
econometric participation function related to variables like the direct resource costs of 
conservation, the direct utility of the farmer derived from conservation activities, and 
the transactions costs borne by farmers in relation to participation. Transaction costs 
borne by farmers in relation to schemes might pose constraints on participation. In-
formation-gathering, for example, on the economics of converting to organic farming 
and how to change management practices, can be a key component of the transactions 
costs incurred by farmers wishing to participate in conservation schemes. 
 
Falconer (2000) also considers the extent to which farmers’ transaction costs con-
strain the rate of participation in voluntary agri-environmental schemes in the selected 
EU member countries. The study is based on data collected for the STEWPOL project 
reported by Falconer & Whitby (1999), and discusses and suggests measures to re-
duce private transaction costs and thereby improve scheme uptake. 
 
Falconer & Saunders (2001) compare the total costs – transaction costs and compen-
sation – of individually negotiated and standard management agreements under the 
Wildlife Enhancement Scheme for Sites of Special Scientific Interest in England. 
Public and private transaction costs are estimated on the basis of a range of case study 
agreements. The study aims at quantifying total costs of different approaches to vol-
untary compensated site-specific management agreements. The results indicate that 
better targeting by individually negotiating agreements, although costly in the initial 
phase, can lead to a reduction in monitoring costs, and hence can be less costly than 
standard agreements when the full policy life cycle is considered. 
 
Vernimmen et al. (2000) employ cross-section farm survey data to investigate farm-
ers’ decisions regarding administrative tasks based on questionnaires from 385 repre-
sentative Belgian farmers. The study quantifies the number and type of regulations 
faced by the farmers as well as indicates the farmers’ time input use (in labour hours 
                                                 
29 Drake et al. (1999). The study has not been available for this presentation. 
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per year) on selected administrative tasks pertaining to individual regulations, e.g. ac-
counting, fiscal declarations, manure regulation, permits, CAP, and environmental 
programmes. For example, administrative tasks related to manure regulations were 
applicable for 139 out of 385 farmers, corresponding to 36 per cent, while 18 percent 
of the surveyed farmers performed administrative tasks related to environmental regu-
lations. Of these, around 50 per cent used 2 hours or less per year on the tasks, while a 
quarter of the farms spent from 2 to 5 hours per year. Around 18 per cent of the farms 
spent between 5 and 20 hours per year on administration related to voluntary envi-
ronmental programmes, and finally, some 7 per cent had an annual time resource in-
put of more than 20 hours. These figures can be compared to time spent on account-
ing regulations, where half of 290 applicable respondents state that they use more 
than 20 hours each year to comply with administrative requirements. Based on a 
transaction cost economics perspective, the study uses an econometric probit model to 
estimate the impact of decision factors like the complexity and frequency of the ad-
ministrative tasks on the probability of the farmers deciding to outsource all or parts 
of their administrative tasks. The study concludes that the farmers’ decisions whether 
or not to outsource paperwork depend on the complexity and the uncertainty about a 
positive outcome of the underlying regulations as well as on the reduction in time 
spent by the farmer on various administrative tasks. 
 
In Mann (2002) the concept of administrative elasticity – the monetary volume of 
transfers linked with the administrative costs of a programme – is adapted to agricul-
tural policies, and then applied to the administration of German export subsidies. 
 
OECD (2003, p. 93) compares the administrative costs for negotiated agreements and 
tradable permit schemes, and indicates that while the set-up costs may be significantly 
higher for tradable permit schemes than for negotiated agreements30, the operating 
costs of a well functioning tradable permit scheme can be very low. 
3.2.3. Other countries 
McCann & Easter (1999) estimates and compares the transaction costs of four differ-
ent policies for the reduction of agricultural phosphorous pollution in the Minnesota 
River. The objective is to determine whether transaction costs help explain the preva-
lence of actually observed policies and to identify determinants of environmental pol-
                                                 
30 Although very low establishment costs for negotiated agreements may lead to less suitable 
agreements – in the sense that the risk of moral hazard etc. can increase the need for (and hence the 
costs of) monitoring or that ambiguity in the wording of the agreements may imply expensive litiga-
tion. 
  
 Administration Costs of Agri-environmental Regulations, FOI 31
icy related transaction costs. Estimates of public costs incurred under the four scenar-
ios are based on in-depth interviews with government officials and from question-
naires to relevant agencies. The estimated labour requirements of staff are translated 
into monetary terms using average salaries, and recurring costs are discounted at a 
rate of 5 per cent over a 10-year period. Results indicate that in terms of transaction 
costs the cheapest way to achieve the objective of reducing phosphorous pollution of 
the Minnesota River is to levy a tax on phosphorus fertilizer (0.9 million $), whereas 
the use of permanent easements under the RIM programme (an administrative regula-
tion) entailed transaction costs of 9.4 million $. The other policy measures – require-
ments for conservation tillage (7.9 million $) and an information-based measure as 
the improvement of the agricultural extension service (3.1 million $) were given in-
termediate ranking with respect to transaction costs. 
 
Another study by the same authors (McCann & Easter, 2000) analyses the magnitude 
of public sector transaction costs of the US Natural Resource Conservation Service 
(NRCS) programmes. The study aims at identifying the determinants of transaction 
costs by regression analysis of the relationship between transaction costs, abatement 
costs, region and type of conservation practice. Administrative costs are calculated 
from time estimates obtained from interviews multiplied by average salaries. Other 
costs are drawn from NRCS agency records of agreements where a conservation prac-
tice had been installed with public sector involvement in the form of cost-share (sub-
sidy) and technical assistance. These records detailed conservation practices and pub-
lic implementation, and public and private conservation costs. The study estimates 
total conservation costs per acre to be $32.84, of which public (not just NRCS) trans-
action costs constitute 38 per cent and public and private abatement costs the remain-
ing 62 per cent. The transaction costs are found to increase with abatement costs and 
vary according to region and conservation practice. 
 
Carpentier et al. (1998) analyse transaction and compliance costs of reducing nitrogen 
runoff from farms by 40 per cent, using perfectly targeted and uniform performance 
standards. Transaction costs are estimated by identifying and budgeting31 costs of ac-
tivities required to target and enforce nitrogen runoff reductions. Activities include 
initial activities and costs to collect information, contract with the farmer and to en-
force32 the agreement for each regulatory standard as well as the activities and costs to 
update the implementation each year over a ten-year horizon. 
                                                 
31 Using standard hourly rates of farmers, agronomic experts and lawyers 
32 Enforcement costs do not include litigation in this study 
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Thompson (1999) presents an institutional transaction costs framework for public pol-
icy analysis and demonstrates its use by comparing transaction costs and compliance 
costs from a non-tradeable effluent limit permit system with effluent charges to con-
trol water pollution from American textile mills. Based on readily available statistics, 
rough estimates from government and industry officials, and drawing on German ex-
periences with an effluent charges system, differences in transaction costs and com-
pliance costs between the two water quality policies are estimated. Costs are divided 
into enactment incl. lobbying by industry and NGOs, implementation, and detection 
and prosecution costs. The study shows that transaction costs are significantly smaller 
for the charge systems. The inclusion of transaction costs in the policy analysis, how-
ever, did not change the optimal policy choice as given by a conventional cost-benefit 
analysis. 
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4. Main findings and conclusions 
The literature shows that transaction and/or administration costs for both public agen-
cies and private agents are important components in the over-all costs and transfer 
payments linked to agri-environmental regulations. Furthermore, it has been found 
that administrative costs may constitute significant proportions of the other costs or 
payments involved in a given regulation, e.g. tax revenues or subsidies. These relative 
administrative costs – e.g. administration costs as a percentage of total costs or total 
transfer payments – serve as an intuitive indicator of the relative merits of different 
policies. There is, however, no (easy) way to point towards a theoretically under-
pinned concept for measuring and assessing the relative costs. And a policy instru-
ment that implies relatively high administrative costs may be preferred if the associ-
ated compliance costs are relatively low and the proper incentives are provided, ren-
dering the use of the instrument cost efficient compared to others. Also, assessing pol-
icy instruments on the basis of relative administrative costs will yield misleading re-
sults when comparing e.g. revenue generating taxes with regulations that do not entail 
any payments. 
 
The relative magnitude of public transaction costs falls within a very wide range in 
the studies covered in this paper – from less than 1 per cent of total tax revenue in the 
case of a levy on nitrogen fertiliser (Rougoor et al. 2001) to almost 140 per cent in a 
Norwegian programme for the preservation of cattle races (Vatn et al. 2002). The up-
per bound of this range is virtually limitless in cases where the actual compensation 
payments, etc., are very low; especially if only the short run – e.g. within a single year 
– is considered as in the case of English organic aid schemes in 1994, where adminis-
trative costs totalled 91 per cent of total costs, and no agreements were finalised that 
year (Falconer & Whitby, 1999). 
 
The Vatn et al. (2002) study uses transaction costs relative to transfer payments as an 
indicator of policy efficiency. This approach means, however, that the results are dif-
ficult to generalise to policies that do not involve payments. Furthermore, merely fo-
cusing on the relative transaction costs as the indicator of efficiency in a context of 
policy analysis may lead to flawed conclusions with respect to instrument choice. In 
these circumstances, the sum of transaction costs, transfer payments as well as com-
pliance costs is the proper indicator to be used. Plus of course, ideally some kind of 
quantification of the expected or realised benefits of the individual modes of regula-
tion should be included in an analysis of the relative merits of different policies. 
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However, the compliance costs and benefits of various policies are difficult to quan-
tify for lack of data and even conceptually. Furthermore, even many of the direct 
costs of regulation are not easily identified from accounts, etc., as there are no univer-
sally accepted conventions as to accounting for them. In sum, when respecting its 
limitations, the concept of relative transaction costs can serve as a useful indicator of 
the relative advantages of different policies and may point towards general determi-
nants of transaction costs in the individual policies. 
 
If information is collected regularly as an integral part of other regulations, this proc-
ess emulates an attachment to market conditions and low asset specificity, and hence, 
relatively low expected transaction costs. Examples of this situation are reporting of 
field size for property tax purposes or crop rotation for manure and fertiliser account-
ing, or declaration of price and quantity data for company tax or trade statistics pur-
poses. If policies or measures can be attached to commodities or existing market 
structures, the administrative/transaction costs are relatively low compared to the total 
(financial) costs indicated by the total volume of subsidy or the tax revenue. This re-
sult is in accordance with what would be theoretically expected, as the attachment to 
market structures implies a low degree of asset specificity, and hence low transaction 
costs. If, on the other hand, the transaction of the regulation is characterised by a high 
degree of asset specificity, a special and costly system has to be implemented. 
 
The volume of payments related to each individual measure indicates to some degree 
the extent to which efficient administrative routines have been developed, and in this 
respect the existence of a learning curve. The volume of payments provides in itself a 
clear incentive to establish cost-minimising and efficient procedures for handling ap-
plications and transfers of payments, etc. Another explanation of the relatively low 
percentage of administrative costs is the existence of economies of scale related to the 
handling of taxes and/or subsidies. 
 
The frequency and reoccurrence of the individual administrative tasks seem to be im-
portant determinants of transaction costs. This is probably due to agents acquiring the 
necessary skills and know-how and establishes cost-saving routines, parallel to the 
speculations above. Requirements for special monitoring and enforcement routines 
increase transaction costs. E.g. documentation records with respect to preservation of 
certain cattle races or a verification of organic production methods can lead to in-
creased monitoring and enforcement costs that may cause a doubling and even a tri-
pling of total transaction costs. More generally, administrative costs increases with 
the extent to which measures are dependent on some kind of specialised knowledge, 
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inspection efforts, etc., implying a high degree of asset specificity. Moreover, quanti-
tative indicators such as the volume of payments and the frequency or reoccurrence of 
transactions constitute efficient incentives to establish cost-minimising administrative 
routines and to ‘quickly climb up the learning curve’. This may lead to quite small 
relative transaction costs (as percentage of associated payments) or to declining costs 
per transaction. 
 
It is important to recognise that the private sector is not a homogenous group but 
comprises individual farmers as well as different suppliers, etc., that are influenced 
differently be different regulations. In the case of an environmental tax being levied 
on e.g. pesticides, wholesalers and retailers may face additional administrative tasks, 
whereas the individual farmers will probably not incur additional administrative tasks 
because of the tax. Conversely, in the case of mandatory pesticide application jour-
nals, the administrative burden is placed on the individual farmers, leaving suppliers, 
etc., unaffected. 
 
There are many empirical and theoretical obstacles to comparing the results of differ-
ent studies and transferring them to other analyses. This is partly because there is no 
universally agreed upon definition of transaction costs, and different studies thus in-
clude different components. Also, there is no common yardstick for assessing the 
magnitude of transaction costs. 
 
A survey of the empirical literature on transaction and administrative costs does not 
provide any conclusive evidence of the relative administrative costs of different pol-
icy instruments. Nonetheless, a few studies have indicated that market-based instru-
ments may be characterised by a potential for lower administrative costs than those of 
detailed regulations of a command-and-control type for similar environmental issues. 
Also, in some of the surveyed literature, more theoretical arguments indicate that 
regulations based on existing market structures tend to be characterised by relatively 
low administrative costs. 
 
A general impression from surveying empirical evidence and more theoretical studies 
is thus that the transaction and/or administrative costs of market-based instruments 
are generally quite low compared to similar costs associated with voluntary agree-
ments and administrative regulations. However, the survey has been able to cast very 
little light on the administrative costs of conventional administrative regulations. The 
reasons for this are not clear, but it probably stems from the gradual evolution of e.g. 
the legal complex and the multitude of regulatory tasks performed by the authorities 
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and the implicit difficulties in isolating the administrative input into separate regula-
tions. Another contributing factor can be that some kind of evaluation procedure in-
volving administrative efficiency, etc., is a mandatory component in many novel 
schemes, e.g. voluntary management agreements. 
 
Theoretically, the notion that the degree of asset specificity determines transaction 
costs to a significant extent supports the conclusion that the administrative costs of 
market-based instruments are lower than those of conventional administrative regula-
tions. Traditional regulations in the form of specified rules and standards often imply 
highly specialised procedures or equipment and personnel with a good knowledge of 
detailed and specific circumstances regarding the environmental problem as well as 
technical solutions, etc. To the extent that these aspects can be said to involve a 
higher degree of technical, human or other forms of asset specificity, it may be in-
ferred from transaction costs economic theory (cf. Williamson 1985, 1996) that ad-
ministrative regulations potentially entails significant transaction costs compare to 
market-based instruments. This conclusion is also supported by e.g. the findings of 
McCann & Easter (1999), where the administrative costs of various solutions to 
phosphorous pollution in the Minnesota River – e.g. extension measures and volun-
tary management agreements – are estimated to be from more than 3 times to almost 
10 times as expensive as a tax on fertiliser. Similarly, Thompson (1999) finds that the 
administrative costs of effluent charges are significantly lower than the similar costs 
of a system of non-tradable effluent limit system for regulation of water quality. 
 
However, this tentative conclusion does not imply that market-based instruments are 
superior33 to other instruments in all situations, even though efficiency arguments in 
favour of market-based instruments can be produced as well. The reason for this is 
that economic instruments are only applicable to certain types of environmental prob-
lems; most notably where some form of market for environmental goods or services 
exists. In many other cases, especially where specific locations are involved or highly 
specialised knowledge or operations is imperative in handling the relevant problem, 
other forms of regulation must be used in order to better comply with the objectives 
of the regulator. 
 
The majority of the studies analyse various voluntary agri-environmental schemes, 
typically involving adopting specified management practices. However, it is not obvi-
ous what ranking such measures should be given with respect to administrative costs 
                                                 
33 With respect to minimising administrative as well as total costs. 
  
 Administration Costs of Agri-environmental Regulations, FOI 37
compared to other policy instruments. Falconer & Whitby (1999) claim that even 
though data are limited, it appears that voluntary agri-environmental schemes are 
generally more costly to administer compared to other policy types, e.g. commodity 
regimes for farm income support. In contrast to other policy types, this is mainly be-
cause voluntary agri-environmental schemes involve direct interaction with farmers at 
all stages. Vernimmen et al. (2000) observe that the participation of farmers in volun-
tary environmental programmes is relatively non-costly in terms of labour input as the 
conditions of the agreement are fixed and given by the authorities, and do not involve 
any time-consuming optimisation procedures by individual farmers. This is probably 
not true for all similar regulations, but will depend on the design of the actual scheme 
and the administrative set-up, etc. Voluntary or negotiated agreements constitute a 
very heterogeneous group of policy instruments, and it does seem difficult to point 
towards general results with respect to the administrative costs. 
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